Strategic Analysis Of U.S. Special Operations During The Korean Conflict
(eBook)

Book Cover
Average Rating
Published
Normanby Press, 2015.
ISBN
9781782899624
Status
Available Online
Description
Loading Description...
Also in this Series
Checking series information...
More Like This
Loading more titles like this title...
More Details
Format
eBook
Language
English
Reviews from GoodReads
Loading GoodReads Reviews.
Citations
APA Citation (style guide)

Major Steve A. Fondacaro., & Major Steve A. Fondacaro|AUTHOR. (2015). Strategic Analysis Of U.S. Special Operations During The Korean Conflict. Normanby Press.

Chicago / Turabian - Author Date Citation (style guide)

Major Steve A. Fondacaro and Major Steve A. Fondacaro|AUTHOR. 2015. Strategic Analysis Of U.S. Special Operations During The Korean Conflict. Normanby Press.

Chicago / Turabian - Humanities Citation (style guide)

Major Steve A. Fondacaro and Major Steve A. Fondacaro|AUTHOR, Strategic Analysis Of U.S. Special Operations During The Korean Conflict. Normanby Press, 2015.

MLA Citation (style guide)

Major Steve A. Fondacaro, and Major Steve A. Fondacaro|AUTHOR. Strategic Analysis Of U.S. Special Operations During The Korean Conflict. Normanby Press, 2015. Web.

Note! Citation formats are based on standards as of July 2010. Citations contain only title, author, edition, publisher, and year published. Citations should be used as a guideline and should be double checked for accuracy.
Staff View
Go To Grouped Work

Grouping Information

Grouped Work IDb18e01e2-c68e-c4ef-121b-94afe01bd036
Full titlestrategic analysis of u s special operations during the korean conflict
Authorfondacaro major steve a
Grouping Categorybook
Last Update2021-04-21 14:01:17PM
Last Indexed2021-06-13 04:17:10AM

Book Cover Information

Image Sourcehoopla
First LoadedJun 14, 2021
Last UsedJun 14, 2021

Hoopla Extract Information

stdClass Object
(
    [year] => 2015
    [artist] => Major Steve A. Fondacaro
    [fiction] => 
    [coverImageUrl] => https://d2snwnmzyr8jue.cloudfront.net/ins_9781782899624_270.jpeg
    [titleId] => 11521998
    [isbn] => 9781782899624
    [abridged] => 
    [language] => ENGLISH
    [profanity] => 
    [title] => Strategic Analysis Of U.S. Special Operations During The Korean Conflict
    [demo] => 
    [segments] => Array
        (
        )

    [pages] => 76
    [children] => 
    [artists] => Array
        (
            [0] => stdClass Object
                (
                    [name] => Major Steve A. Fondacaro
                    [relationship] => AUTHOR
                )

        )

    [genres] => Array
        (
            [0] => Asia
            [1] => History
            [2] => India & South Asia
            [3] => Korean War
            [4] => Military
        )

    [price] => 0.49
    [id] => 11521998
    [edited] => 
    [kind] => EBOOK
    [active] => 1
    [upc] => 
    [synopsis] => This study analyzes the strategic effectiveness of special operations conducted by the Far East Command (FECOM) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Korea during the Korean Conflict from 1950 to 1953. Each organization's effectiveness is determined by examining the areas of strategy, organization and operations. Special operations as defined in Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication Number 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) was the standard by which operations were selected for examination. The study answers four questions: 1) What were the U.N. Command strategic objectives within the Korean theater, and how did these change? , 2) How these changing strategic objectives development and coordination of special operations objectives, forces and headquarters?, 3) What did U.S. special operations in Korea accomplish strategically? 4) What conclusions can be drawn from U.S. special operations forces' effectiveness or ineffectiveness in Korea? FECOM special operations were limited to partisan operations and psychological operations. The partisans consisted of anti-communist North Koreans organized and led by U.S. cadre beginning in January, 1951. Psychological operations were conducted continuously from July, 1950 by a separate staff element whose capabilities expanded dramatically during the course of the conflict. CIA operations within Korea consisted of intelligence gathering and special (or covert) activities controlled from headquarters in Japan. CIA operations remained autonomous of FECOM control throughout the conflict. The control issue was the source of bureaucratic conflict that inhibited operational coordination between FECOM and CIA throughout the conflict.
    [url] => https://www.hoopladigital.com/title/11521998
    [pa] => 
    [publisher] => Normanby Press
)
1